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ABSTRACT: Urban sprawl’s negative impacts have been amply demonstrated, starting as long as
30 years ago, and most North American urban plans have, somewhere, reference to sprawl as
bad policy  (or,  perhaps,  absence of  policy).  Yet  North  Americans  continue to tolerate  the
construction of more and more suburban subdivisions. This paper suggests an answer to this
paradox.  We argue that  sprawl’s  attractiveness—if  one can call  it  that—is  buried deep in
North American cultural predispositions, which we trace to quite specific interpretations of the
mechanistic  worldview  that  emerged  from  17th  and  18th  century  revolutions  in  natural
philosophy.  North  American  culture  is  a  scientific  culture  as  well  as  a  suburban  one.  If
mechanistic science and its peculiar view of nature is so pervasive and if suburban sprawl is
both pervasive and dysfunctional, then this particular  form of science and its cultural  roots
need to be carefully  examined.  We do this from the perspective of the 21st century,  when
quantum physics and new discoveries in the ecological and biological sciences are suggesting
that many commonly accepted assumptions about physical  reality  inherited from 17th and
18th century science are flawed.
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INTRODUCTION
Urban sprawl’s negative impacts have been amply demonstrated, starting as long as
30 years ago, and most North American urban plans have, somewhere, reference to
sprawl as bad policy (or, perhaps, absence of policy). Yet North Americans continue to
tolerate the construction of more and more suburban subdivisions. Why? This paper
suggests  an  answer  to  this  question.  Specifically,  we  posit  links  between  scientific
worldviews and models of urban and suburban development.
In the last few years, opposition to sprawl has grown somewhat stronger in the
United States and Canada. On the one hand, businesses—at least those with some
roots in a metropolitan area—are starting to realize how costly sprawl is to any sensible
system of  commerce (Leo et  al.  1998; GTA Task Force 1996; Orlebeke 2002).  In
addition, research is exploding on other costs—from obesity and social dysfunctions to
enormous amounts of air, water,  and soil pollution (Bray et al. 2005;  Gurin 2003).
Some writers have warned that North America’s style of suburban development is the
most serious single threat to human survival (Register 2002, 106). On the other hand, a
new generation of writers and architects has not only produced devastating critiques of
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suburbanization, but also provided concrete examples of alternative ways of building
(Duany,  Playter-Zyberk,  and  Speck  2000;  Kunstler  1996;  Marshall  2000).  These
alternative developments have been popular with homebuyers and even some urban
planners and politicians.
Nevertheless,  the  momentum of  North America’s  sprawl has  hardly  slackened
(Lopez and Hynes 2003). An enormous infrastructure is in place: hundreds of billions of
dollars in highways, water, and sewer lines; and existing shopping malls, housing, and
industrial  parks. Furthermore,  a  financial  and institutional  infrastructure,  including
many generous and significant subsidies, which produced such development, is in place
and operating smoothly (Winfield 2003; Savitch, 2002).  It would be easy to blame
corporate developers’  political  influence and monopolization of  the  market  in  new
housing for  this  state  of  affairs;  but  these  companies  are  clearly  appealing  to  a
responsive clientele. 
In this paper we argue that sprawl’s attractiveness—if one can call it that—is buried
deep  in  North American cultural  predispositions,  which  we trace  to  quite  specific
interpretations of the mechanistic worldview that emerged from 17th  and 18th century
revolutions  in natural  philosophy.  These cultural forces were part  of  the collective
psyche of the millions of Europeans who emigrated to the New World in the 17th, 18th,
and 19th centuries, people who fashioned North America’s non-aboriginal culture. By
the close of the 19th century this culture had developed an abiding faith in mechanistic
science and its promise of material progress. Furthermore, by the 1960s, this culture
was also a suburban culture.  Suburban sprawl  is  now a central  defining feature of
North America’s politics, social life, and economics. We focus on this modern North
American phenomenon, even though North American-style suburban development has
invaded Western Europe as well as many Third World countries.
North American culture, then, is a scientific culture as well as a suburban one. If
mechanistic science and its  peculiar view of nature is  so pervasive and if  suburban
sprawl is both pervasive and dysfunctional, then this particular form of science and its
cultural roots need to be carefully examined. We do this from the perspective of the 21st
century, when quantum physics and new discoveries in the ecological and biological
sciences are  suggesting  that  many  commonly  accepted assumptions about  physical
reality inherited from 17th and 18th century  science are flawed.  We argue that  21st
century science’s revision of those assumptions can be correlated with more sensible
forms of development than North American sprawl. It must be stressed that we see
mechanistic science itself as an outgrowth of early 17th century socio-cultural upheavals.
A brief review of this point is appropriate. 
THE GROWTH OF MECHANISTIC CULTURE
Science and society are interwoven profoundly at the start of the 21st century. Quite
literally,  contemporary  societies  are  inconceivable  without  their  massive  scientific
infrastructure.  It  is,  therefore,  easy  for  us  to  forget  how  recent  this  intense
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interconnection is in terms of the long span of human history. The history of science in
the ancient world (Egypt, India, and Mesopotamia), in the classical world (Greece and
Rome),  and  in  China,  India,  and  Islam  during  the  Middle  Ages  is  a  record  of
remarkable scientific achievements (Lindberg 1992; Bodde 1991; Butt 1991). But none
of those cultures gave rise to what we term a modern scientific outlook or worldview
(Huff 1993). It was only in Europe, roughly between 1500 and 1700, that a complex
network of specific cultural, sociopolitical, economic, and religious forces produced a
science whose theoretical and institutionalized structures  emerged as one of the key
features of  society  (Seitz  1992).  Scientific  ideas  and  methodology  permeated  the
thought of the 17th and 18th (Jacob 1988). Although 17th century science owed a great
debt to classical and medieval achievements, it emphasized a mechanistic philosophy of
nature—with important but increasingly marginalized residues of magical and mystical
traditions (Martin 1992; Goodman and Russell 1991). Political, economic, and religious
elites  aggressively promoted the acceptance of,  and ideological commitment to, the
mechanistic philosophy, which was based on a search for certainty. This certainty was
to be achieved by means of powerful scientific method and epistemology.
Associated  with  luminaries of  the  17th century’s  Scientific  Revolution1 such  as
Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilee, Rene Descartes, and Isaac Newton, this epistemology
provided the paradigm for a radically new approach to the understanding of nature
and  of  humanity’s  relationship  to  its  physical,  metaphysical,  and  socio-cultural
environments. This understanding was predicated upon a synthesis of the deductive (as
exemplified  by  Descartes)  and  inductive/empirical  (as  exemplified  by  Bacon)
approaches  to  the  study  of  nature—a  synthesis  symbolised  by  the  towering
achievements  of  Newton.  There is  a  vast  literature  on  the  symbiosis between  the
ideology of mechanism, the new scientific method, and their political and economic
milieux in 17th and 18th century Europe (Dobbs and Jacob 1995; Golinski 1998; Shapin
and Schaffer 1985). By the 19th century, the mutual interaction between science and the
broader culture became a dominant feature of European societies. Indeed, by the 1870s
it became common to speak of  “a scientific culture, rather than science in culture”
(Yeo 1993, 32).
Those developing the mechanistic worldview in the 17th century had the explicit
ideological goal that it permeate all spheres of culture (Shapin 1996; Jacob 1988). In the
18th century,  the  European  Enlightenment  was  a  powerful  intellectual
institutionalization  of  this  mechanistic  philosophy.2 The Enlightenment  also set  the
1 Scholarship of the past two decades has undermined the notion of an unambiguously defined Scientific
Revolution (Lindberg and Westman 1990).
2 This was by no means an uncontested process. For an important account of several movements that
posited powerful alternatives to the mechanistic paradigm see Reill 1999. Reill is especially useful for his
account of  “that loose group of thinkers, less frequently studied, though numerous, whom [he calls], for
want of a better term, Enlightenment vitalists. Their inquiries usually centered on the fields of chemistry,
geology,  the life sciences and natural history.  Unlike the [mechanists],  they sought  to reformulate the
concept of matter, along with those of force, power and connection in their construction of a science that
respected natural variety, dynamic change, and the epistemological consequences of skepticism” regarding
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stage for the 19th century belief that this new science might afford humans the ability to
modify and possibly control nature for the betterment of their species (although this had
also been an important message of Bacon over a century earlier) (Greene 1992). The
scope and impact of scientific activity grew dramatically in the 19th century, as did the
effectiveness of the propagandists praising the virtues of  (ostensible) objectivity and its
contribution  to  empirical  certainty.  Our  analysis  will  connect  the  phenomenon of
sprawl to five specific cultural manifestations of this kind of science: 
(1) science’s professionalization, with its associated organizations and institutions;
(2) the equating of scientific with democratic ideals (most notably in the writings of
the philosophers of the Enlightenment)3;
(3) science’s identification with the urban-industrial order; 
(4) humans’ increasing sense  of  separation from the rest of  nature,  since both
individuals  and  societies  were  learning  to  live  in  a  re-created  physical
environment controlled and refashioned by science and technology; 
(5) the linkage of science to concepts of sociopolitical ‘progress.’ 
These science/society interfaces were a major part of what has come to be called the
scientific  culture  of  Western  Europe  and North America of  the  last  two centuries
(Merchant 1980, Ravetz 1990).
MECHANISTIC SCIENCE AND THE SUBURBAN LANDSCAPE
Our specific argument is that this culture’s mechanistic worldview has been one key
element in the emergence of the modern suburb’s landscape. It is a landscape that is
human-built, a product of human intentions and cultural conditioning. We are focusing
on what our ancestors lived and thought as they were laying the foundations of this
landscape, but we invite the reader to ponder how our descendants will respond to the
landscape we are now creating (Cannadine 2002, 188-189). The meaning of this built
techno-scientific landscape cannot be underestimated. While we hope to show that in
some ways it is a legacy of mechanistic science, this landscape is also an influence on
our  behaviour,  our  sense  of  wellbeing,  and  the way we frame policy  alternatives,
particularly in North America (Fowler 1992). Before proceeding, however, it is worth
noting that the mechanical worldview was formulated first by Europeans, only some of
whom colonized the New World.
mechanistic reductionism (Reill 1999, 365). The Enlightenment vitalists include such eminent figures as
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Friedrich Schiller, G.L. Buffon, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The
critiques  of  the  Enlightenment  vitalists  regarding the  mechanistic  paradigm  influenced  Romanticism,
German Naturphilosophie and such twentieth century thinkers as Max Horkenheimer and T. Adorno.
3 This generalization is  subject  to two important  caveats: a)  not  all  the philosophes were  democratic
(Voltaire was elitist  in his  political  thought;  Rousseau’s  conception of  democracy  was restrictive,  e.g.,
women were given a lesser role in his ideal society); and b) insofar as the Enlightenment can be said to have
been one of the major influences on the French Revolution, the politics of the Revolution—despite the
slogan of egalitarianism—were often totalitarian or statist in practice (Outram 1995). 
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In fact, with respect to urban planning, there is a strong contrast between European
and North American practices. It is  clear that Europeans have self-consciously and
vigorously  resisted  urban  sprawl,  even  though  they  are  inheritors  of  the  same
epistemological worldview. A partial answer to this apparent inconsistency has been
provided  by  Louis  Hartz  and  Gad  Horowitz  (Horowitz  1968).  They  argue  that
colonizers from Europe brought only a fragment of European culture with them—the
worldview of liberalism that was emerging at the time—and then proceeded to evolve
in their own way without the presence of the legacies of feudalism and of monarchism,
which of course remained part of the physical and intellectual landscape of Europe. For
example, Hartz and Horowitz explain the weakness of socialism in North America by
the absence of feudalism’s collective traditions.
European  urban  planning’s  aggressive  stance  against  sprawl  would  never  be
accepted in  liberal  North America,  where  land  ownership is  considered  far  more
sacrosanct (many immigrants had had their land taken out from under them by the
enclosures, especially in Great Britain). This ideological stance was supported by an
overwhelming abundance of raw land in the New World. Such open space was simply
unavailable to Europeans. Limited access to fossil fuels also constrained any tendency
to  build  car-oriented  suburbs. We  maintain  that  the  mechanical  worldview
accompanying liberalism (Barber 1984), while still dominant in Europe after the 18th
century,  was  nonetheless  part  of  a  much richer  cultural mix.  Combined with the
scarcity of oil and land, this mix helps to explain that continent’s different approach to
urban development (Beatley 2000).4 This approach has included the design of dense,
mixed-use  neighborhoods  that  include  shops,  a  certain  percentage  of  subsidized
housing, public courtyards and squares, and generous amounts of green space. The
result, according to Beatley, has been a broad array of lively and sustainable downtown
districts all across Europe.
Our central thesis, then, is that we in North America are still living physically and
epistemologically under  the  powerful  spell  of  a  mechanistic  paradigm not  just  for
science, but also for culture. Urban sprawl, as we shall see, is one of the most pervasive
embodiments  of  this  worldview. Within  the  context  of  North  American suburban
development,  we  shall  point  to  cases  where actors  have  used  mechanistic  science
consciously to serve their own agendas but give other examples in which it is expressed
as a broad cultural trait that is one of several influences on aggregate choice patterns. 
 Physics and biology have moved far from the 17th and 18th century focus on the
application of Newtonian mechanics to the study of matter, plants, animals, and human
society. The emergence of mechanistic science was in some ways only a transitional
phase between Aristotelian epistemology on the one hand and quantum mechanics and
the ecological sciences on the other. Nevertheless, even now, we in the West live our
4 In contrast to writers such as Alexander (1972), Mumford (1961), and Beatley (2000), Jackson (1985)
dismisses the cultural arguments and argues that economics was the only important factor: when Europe is
rich enough, he writes, it will  build sprawl. See pp. 239, 303. And, indeed, a recent commentator has
pointed this out (Marshall 2000, 92-6). The case of Ireland seems to bear him out (Lynas 2004).
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lives and interact with our environment in ways that in many respects follow the siren
call of mechanistic science, even though its cultural underpinnings date to 1650 and
earlier. Kuhn and others have shown that how scientists frame a question about Nature
is conditioned by structures of thought peculiar to the era (Kuhn 2000; Shapin 1996;
Berman 1981). These structures, according to Barber (1984) can be considered “pre-
conceptual,” since they make assumptions about the nature of reality and about human
relations to it in ways that reflect deep cultural trends and precede theory and analysis.
We shall  focus on three  preconceptual  assumptions  (obviously not  exhaustive)  that
underlie mechanistic science, and therefore its culture: (1) the assumption of objectivity;
(2) the pre-eminent importance of the search for a new kind of certainty and security,
especially  by  means  of  quantitative  methods  and  predictive  models;  and  (3)
materialism’s postulate of reductionism, with its corollary that bits of matter are discrete
and  cannot  interpenetrate  each  other  (an  ‘either/or’  as  opposed  to  a  ‘both/and’
perspective). (For a more sophisticated list, see Merchant 1992.)
These assumptions will be used to structure the linking of 19th century scientific
culture to North America’s sprawl culture in the late 20th century. There is nothing
sacrosanct, of course, about mechanistic science’s pre-conceptual assumptions. In fact,
scientific research during the last century, as mentioned, has made them questionable.
The corollary of this point is that other, more inclusive pre-conceptual assumptions
would leave us free to explore more sensible forms of human settlement than sprawl.
I. OBJECTIVITY AND PARTICIPATION
  A fundamental axiom of mechanistic science is objectivity. We use the term axiom
literally:  i.e.,  a precondition/principle for doing/thinking ‘mechanistically’,  which is
assumed rather than proven. The assumption of objectivity says, in part, that we can
observe objects and phenomena without affecting them. 
 The roots  of  the  objectivity debate,  both  in terms of  the content  of  scientific
knowledge and the role of the individual scientist in constructing that content, date
back at least as early as the 16th and 17th centuries. However, it was during the 18th
century Enlightenment that the contours of the debate assumed their modern form.
The  twin symbols  of  ‘reason’  and  ‘nature’  dominated  Enlightenment  attempts  to
establish what were grandly hoped to be ‘objective’ sciences of humanity and society, as
well  as  physics,  astronomy,  chemistry,  and  biology.  Led  by  a  group  of  brilliant
individuals known as the philosophes, including Denis Diderot, Jean Lerond D’Alembert,
Francois Marie Arouet de Voltaire, David Hume, and the Marquis de Condorcet, the
Enlightenment epitomized the explicit effort to propagandize on behalf of the scientific
outlook (Hankins 1985;  Outram 1995, 47-62).  A key ingredient in the philosophes’
campaign  was  that  social  progress  would  automatically  issue  from  an  increased
satisfaction of material needs, which in turn would be a direct consequence of liberating
the intellect from traditional superstition and irrationality.5 And, indeed, since the start
5  The precise degree to which such progress would necessitate major democratic reforms in government or
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of the 19th century there is no doubt that Westerners have seen themselves as using
science  and  technology  to  transform  dramatically  both  physical  and  social
environments.
Debates over the desirability of such a transformation continued to heat up during
the 19th century—a testimony to the power of the Enlightenment’s vision (Hulme and
Jordanova 1990). These debates took on a new character after the 1860s, however,
when the scientific naturalists, led by Thomas H. Huxley and his allies—including John
Tyndall, Leslie Stephen, and John Morley, as well as Herbert Spencer and Francis
Galton—embarked on a vigorous campaign to persuade all levels of the public that
science was objective and ideologically neutral. If science were accepted as an objective
quest,  then  its  conclusions  would  carry  an  almost  invincible  authority.  Scientific
pronouncements  could then  be  taken as  definitive  in  cultural  as  well  as  technical
matters  (Butts  1993, 313-7;  Yeo 1993; Fichman  1984; Fichman 2002,  66,70,182).
Influential utopian planners such as Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier argued that
their  proposals’  power  came  from  those  proposals’  transcendent  expression  of  a
common good for all citizens, regardless of their politics (Fishman 1977).
The scientific naturalists helped to create a largely secular climate of opinion in
which the theories  and metaphors of  modern science penetrated the institutions of
education,  industry,  and  government  (Turner  1993,  131-32,  179,  196-7).  The
successful  establishment  of  this  community  and  its  authority  tended  with  certain
exceptions to exclude participation by anyone other than the formally trained scientific
elite  in  the  propagation and dissemination  of  knowledge. This was integral  to  the
process of professionalization. 
This  new  scientific  ethos  of  the  late  nineteenth  century  was  enthusiastically
embraced in the United States. The Smithsonian Institution was founded in 1846 as a
government  center for research  and publication in  science. The establishment and
development  of  the  Smithsonian  has  been  crucial  to  the  evolution  of  federally
supported science in America. There was also a growing interaction between scientific
research and technological/industrial innovation that continues to shape the policies
and politics of the United States and other ‘have’ nations (Seitz 1992, 45-46).
To summarize, by the close of the 19th century,  the 17th century assumption of
objectivity  had become a cult,  a  dominant  ideological as  well  as  practical  force in
European and North American culture. Twinned to an ethos of increasing scientific
professionalism, this cult served to discourage laypersons from significant participation
in  devising  the  economic,  sociopolitical,  and philosophical  frameworks  that  would
shape emerging twentieth-century culture.6
could be made compatible with varying degrees of reform within traditional monarchist states is a subject
of  vigorous  historical  investigation  and  controversy.  What  is  clear,  however,  is  that  Enlightenment
propaganda imbued the subjects  of  different countries  with  new aspirations  and new expectations for
change and reform (Outram 1995, 112-113).
6  The cult of objectivity has a history that is replete with subtle and not so subtle claims. See, e.g.,  Daston
1992; Porter 1992. 
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20th Century Physics Challenges the Assumption of Objectivity
Not  being  able  to  meet  the  assumption  of  objectivity  would  invalidate  most
contemporary scientific research, yet physicists studying subatomic particles have found
that the observation process does indeed interact with experimental findings. A notable
example  of  this  phenomenon  involves  light,  which  behaves  like  a  particle  when
experimentally observed one way, but like a wave when observed in another. “The
quantum world,” writes Kosso 
is  one of  essential  uncertainties  and  irresolvable  probabilities…  Things  exist
somehow as waves and particles and yet as neither, an ambiguity that is resolved
only by our intervention in the act of observation. Definitive properties such as
being a wave or a particle, even being in any particular place, seem to be created
by the observer. (Kosso 1998, 3)
Quantum mechanics (and relativity theory) have forced a radical rethinking of some of
our  most  basic  concepts  of  “reality”,  including  the  crucial  relationship  between
experiment and hypothesis in the validation of scientific theory. During experiments,
scientists are always manipulating matter to extract its  secrets (Caspary 2000,  50-1;
Galison 1987). But the basic assumption of most practicing scientists—especially those
working in fields other than theoretical physics—remains that this intervention will not
affect the validity of the experiments’ outcomes, or the experiments would not be worth
conducting.
How, then, are the notions of “objectivity” and “participation” affected by the 20th
century revolutions  in physics?  Though its claims are firmly  rooted in experiment,
quantum theory describes the world “in terms that do not apply  (at first glance) to
anything we actually experience in nature…. In the world we observe, everything is
definitely  here  or  there,  moving  at  one  speed  or  another…Bohr  had  quantum
mechanics in mind when he excused physics from the task of reality” (Kosso 1998,
151).  Does  this  mean  that  science  does  not  provide  a  valuable  avenue  for
comprehending nature, ourselves included? Hardly. It simply means that certain results
of quantum mechanics appear bizarre and do present a challenge to our understanding
and credulity. “The quantum world is someplace weird, but that does not mean that it
does not exist…In general, modern physics describes the world in terms that challenge
our imagination and intuition” (Kosso 1998, 175-76). It bears repeating that certain
important elements of our imagination and intuition are still  rooted in 17th century
culture.
Many contemporary scientists maintain that, in spite of observational conundrums
at the particle level, in most contexts rigorous techniques allow us to make observations
and to conduct experiments that enable us to understand and predict the workings of
Nature better and better. Others insist that we are participating in what we observe,
and that our findings are always contaminated by our intentions or techniques in one
way or another. The issue is far from settled (Goldstein 1996, 119-125). It would be
rash to say that the mechanistic paradigm is totally repudiated by quantum mechanics.
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A number of contemporary philosophers of science, such as Cartwright, have argued,
however, against a vision of a uniform world completely ordered by a single elegant
and deterministic theory. Instead, Cartwright claims that the laws of science are not
absolute or final, and that an ideological belief in that absolutist view is misplaced. The
laws of science are more a patchwork than a monolithic unity. Accordingly, the laws of
science are “dappled” and a broader range of connections between scientific paradigms
and actual cultural realities is possible (Cartwright 1999, 34-50). “It’s not the end of the
world. It’s not even the end of our knowledge of the world. It’s just the end of the world
as we know it,” writes Kosso (1998, 186). We suggest that if quantum mechanics spells
the end of the world as we know it, then embracing a quantum view of reality will have
implications for sprawl’s appeal. 
It seems as if the human mind, or perhaps human consciousness, is able to separate
itself  from the rest  of  nature, contemplate it,  analyze it,  and even predict  it.  Brian
Swimme  has  suggested,  though,  the  absurdity  of  assuming  our  separateness  from
nature, even in the act of contemplating her. Whatever position one may take on the
philosophical controversies over the relationship between body and mind, our brains
and our thoughts all emerge from the dirt we stand on (and pave), by the food we eat,
by the air we breathe, by our parents’ bodies and our parents’ love, and ultimately by
the sun’s energy, without which nothing would happen on Earth. Thus, in a real sense,
humans are an example—probably not the only one—of the universe contemplating
itself  (Berry  and  Swimme  1992;  Berman  1981).  Objectivity  in  the  strict  sense  is
impossible. We are participants, whether we like it or not.
It may well be, as Shimon Malin recently put it, that future historians will describe
adherence to ‘the principle of objectivation—whereby a living universe is treated as a
vast collection of chunks of dead matter—as a transitional aberration.’ We admit, along
with Einstein, that ‘possibly [we] did use that line of reasoning, but it is nonsense all the
same.’ (2001, 241)
However, Malin notes,
[S]cience  is  based  not  only  on  the  principle  of  objectivation  but  on  human
experiences as well. Since experiences are subjective and, as experiences, cannot
be objectivized, the very  basis  of the scientific endeavor is  excluded from the
domain of scientific inquiry…This need not be a limitation of science per se. It
may well merely be a characteristic of science as it is currently practiced. It is
possible that the integration of the objective and subjective domains within the
context of the scientific endeavor will be the next decisive step in the evolution of
science (Malin 2001, 230).
This integration not only challenges a basic assumption of mechanistic science. It also
openly acknowledges that we are a part of what we build and that what we build shapes
our behavior. We are thus forced to consider more critically not only the epistemic
claims of  mechanistic science  but also  some of  its  technological offspring,  such as
transportation technology and city building.
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We have shown that by the 19th century the general public could no longer fully
understand the increasingly complex theories of mechanistic science, nor could it enter
meaningfully into debates about the direction scientific and technological developments
should take. Our argument is that this nonparticipation in the scientific enterprise was
part of a more general, nonparticipatory state of mind engendered by the assumption
of objectivity.
 We underline that we are using “participation” in a broad, cross-disciplinary sense,
participation not only in a particular form of science but also in the political system, the
economics of housing, and nature itself. Notwithstanding its many manifestations, we
argue that participation always carries a political meaning, since it refers to the power
or energy contributed by an individual to a collectivity of which she or he is a part.
Defining  participation  in  this  way  also  enlarges  the  scope of  what  is  traditionally
considered political—i.e., elections and the policies and structures of government. For
example, we have shown that 19th century political life in Western Europe and North
America was altered by the rise of a powerful scientific establishment. Furthermore,
participation in the activities and organizations of this establishment was increasingly
limited to those with professional credentials. In this system, the non-specialist became
politically disempowered. Other examples of this process will be suggested below.
Objectivity, Professionalization, and Urban Reform Government
Lack  of  participation  turns  out  to  be  central  to  the  culture  of  sprawl—its
environmental destructiveness, its government, and its planning.
The sense that we humans are somehow separate from nature lies at the base of the
nonparticipatory  worldview.  “Nature”  is  something  over  there  and  is  assigned
contradictory attributes such as cruelty, beneficence, unpredictability, and grandeur.
The suburbs have been desired—and marketed—as a way of “getting closer to nature”
than the polluted and paved central city. In fact, suburban development has done far
more violence to the biosphere than the 19th century industrial city,  by  bulldozing
millions of hectares of prime farmland, by requiring egregious amounts of energy to
service, and by promoting explosive growth in the use of trucks and automobiles. The
car,  in fact, is  one  of  the single  greatest  contributors to the air pollution that  kills
thousands of North Americans every year (Fowler and Layton 2002). This fact is surely
the clearest possible indicator of our disregard for the rest of nature. Mike Davis has
graphically  illustrated  this  disregard  with  specific  respect  to  the  building  of  Los
Angeles’s suburbs, an enterprise which has totally ignored the region’s long term history
of catastrophic seismic and meteorological upheavals (Davis 1998). The irony should
not be missed: in our efforts to get closer to what we see as nature, we end up polluting
and spoiling our nest beyond recognition.
There  is  no  doubt,  of  course,  that  certain  19th century  American pioneers  in
suburban development were genuinely trying to capture some of nature’s wildness in
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their design (Jackson 1985, ch.4). But it is highly misleading to call artificially winding
streets  and  acres  of  lawns  more  organic  and  “natural”  than  what  one  finds  in
downtown neighborhoods. Neither environment  has much “wild” nature left  in  it,
except by accident. It is also misleading to suppose that we as a part of nature can
somehow make something more or less ‘natural.’ This faulty supposition stems in part
from  the  mechanistic worldview that  posits  an  external  ‘nature’  that  humans can
objectively study and manipulate.
The  genesis  of  urban  sprawl’s  government  and  politics  also  illustrates  the
nonparticipatory  worldview.  As  cities’  populations  exploded  in  the  19th century,
municipal governments struggled to keep up with demands for housing, social services,
and physical  infrastructure. Local politicians developed effective  ad hoc organizations
that tried to meet the needs of millions of immigrants from the rural countryside and
from  Europe.  These  organizations  often  turned  into  party  machines  with  a
hammerlock on local government that lasted for decades in cities such as New York
and Chicago  (Banfield 1969, Parts III and IV; Yates 1977, 44; Weaver 1977, 55-73).
To give them their due, these machines staffed police and public works departments,
and built impressive networks of roads, sewers, streetcar lines, waterworks, and electric
and gas lines (Haywood Sanders, as reported in Bridges 1997, 172-3). The loyalty of
immigrants  who  obtained  work  from  these  projects  was  expressed  as  rock  solid
majorities for the machines at election time.
While there was plenty of money to be made by individual businessmen under the
rule of these political machines, the business community as a whole was not pleased at
having  its  fortunes  tied  to  an organization with  unpredictable  and temperamental
bosses and with a power base that rested on an immigrant working class. A reform
movement  sprang  up  to  challenge  the  party  machines’  hegemony.  Although  the
movement’s origins and aims were political, it presented itself as ideologically neutral—
just as the scientific naturalists did. The reforms were designed, in fact, to de-politicize
municipal  government.  The  argument  of  the  reformers  was  that  municipalities,
incorporated as they were by provinces and states, were basically business enterprises,
whose efficient operation depended on objective management principles and technical
expertise (White, 271-4; Tindal and Tindal, 57-60; Anderson 1979; Harrigan 1993;
Banfield and Wilson 1963, Ch. 11 and 12). There was no Republican or socialist way
to pave a street, it was pointed out.
Municipal Reform and the Erosion of Political Participation
The late  19th century  business-led  wave  of  urban reform thus paid homage to
objective science and in particular to the mechanistic worldview (though there is a well-
documented link between business and this science that goes back to the 17th century)
(Jacob  1988;  Ravetz  1990,  120-121;  Pyenson and Sheets-Pyenson  1999,  251-258;
Cohen 1994, 153-203; Merton 1970). The practical impact of this link was to legitimate
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any agenda by appeals to science and statistics:
More  and  more,  the  reformers  placed  their  final  trust  in  the  bureaucratic
method  …a radically  new approach  to  society  and  problem-solving.  At  the
theoretical level, it was founded upon the burgeoning science of statistics. This
science … seemed able to rationalize the complex and mysterious world created
by the new urban-industrial order. (Rutherford 1984, 444-5)
This  urban-industrial  order  included  not  just  poverty  and  homelessness  but  also
massive  new  public  works,  labyrinthine  public  accounts,  and  large  for-profit
corporations. The city itself was seen as a giant machine, which would work smoothly
only  if  its  problems were handled  objectively  and at  arms’  length  by  scientifically
trained  experts—hence  the  call  for  independent  specialized  commissions.  These
commissions,  as  well  as  the  main  municipal  bureaucracy,  were  to  be  staffed  by
professionals who were neutral, objective, and not motivated by any political interests.
From 1880 until well into the 20th century, municipalities embarked on a far-reaching
program to professionalize their large and growing administrations (Yates 1977, 44-67),
ostensibly to take advantage of the powerful new insights into the real world provided
by the scientific method.7 Not coincidentally, civil service reform greatly decreased the
number of jobs available to hand out to friends of political machines.
Whereas the scientific naturalists used the apparent neutrality of science to under-
pin the authority of science itself, urban reformers used that neutrality to underpin their
political legitimacy.
“Scientific” governments’ discouragement of widespread participation in public life
in the 1890s became reflected in the particular urban environment those governments
began  to  build  in  the  20th century—an  environment  that  was  increasingly
accommodating to  the  automobile.  While  urban reformers  were  everywhere,  their
legacy is more evident in the US Southwest, the Canadian West, and in smaller cities,
especially  the late  20th century suburbs.  The older industrial cities  of the East and
Northeast, whose downtowns were less car-friendly, were less affected by the movement
(Bridges 1997, 3-12). There are quite a few large cities in the American Southwest with
nonpartisan  elections  and city  managers,  but  the  consensus of  urban  government
scholars is that “reform-style city government is most likely to be found in suburban
cities” (Harrigan 1993, 115; Banfield and Wilson 1963, 140). One may also observe
that San Diego, Houston, and Phoenix are examples of what happens when cities are
built entirely on the suburban pattern. All these jurisdictions tended to have an ethos
that encouraged management by experts as opposed to participation by citizens. 
One of the salient characteristics of “reformed” cities with nonpartisan elections
and city manager systems (which also tend to have weak mayors) is low turnout in
municipal  elections  (Bridges  1997;  Lineberry  and  Fowler  1968).  Thus,  it  is  not
surprising that the nonparticipatory worldview is a political fact of life in many North
American suburbs. Voter turnouts should be higher there because suburbanites tend to
7 This professionalization of the civil service clearly drew on 19th century French bureaucratic reforms.
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be better educated and to have higher incomes than people who live elsewhere. Despite
this fact, the growing suburban dominance over North American politics (Dale 1999)
has  proceeded  apace  with  steadily  dropping voter  participation.  Voter  turnout  in
municipal elections and participation in local issues is notoriously low in the suburbs
(Alford and Lee 1968; Fowler 1992, 120). 
Nonparticipatory Citybuilding and the Politics of North America
Voting is only part of the story, however. As Mumford puts it, 
Suburbia offers poor facilities for meeting, conversation, collective debate and
common action—it favors silent conformity, not rebellion or counter-attack. So
suburbia has become the favored home of a new kind of absolutism: invisible but
all-powerful. (1961, 513)
Although newer urban and suburban development in North America often includes
semi-public  spaces  of  some  sort—some  in  malls,  some  carefully  integrated  into  a
complex of office buildings—these spaces, argues Kostoff, are too programmed to invite
informal, unpredictable contact (1992, 182). John Sewell notes that there are no truly
public squares for civic gatherings of any sort in the suburbs, no places of sufficient
urban intensity to invite marches or protests (Fowler 1992, 130). Robert Putnam (2000,
ch.12) has found considerable evidence that American suburbanites have retreated into
the privacy of their homes and are participating less and less in local organizations. Part
of the reason is that these people are spending more time in their cars, driving alone
around the ever-expanding city. Finally, Lowi (1979, 267) sees the suburbs as an escape
from political responsibility for the social and economic challenges faced by central
cities, challenges that are not unrelated to the growth of the suburbs themselves (Rusk
1993).8 
Thus,  although the nonparticipatory principles of reform government were laid
down at the end of the 19th century, they were most warmly embraced by 20th century
city regions charged with managing the  sprawling wastelands built  for cars.  These
placeless places are incapable of supporting a vibrant civic life, which requires frequent
face-to-face contact on city streets. When someone needs the car for even the smallest
errand, it is difficult to nurture casual acquaintances with neighbors in the area. As
insignificant as these acquaintanceships might seem at the time, they are the bedrock
for effective collective action when the need arises. They also enrich the civic life of the
entire city in unexpected ways (Jacobs 1961; Fowler 1992). The suburban landscape
can rarely support the organic growth of such relationships.
At a less obvious level, it is worth noting that the houses and malls of suburbia are
all built by large developers for shoppers and residents. Their scale and design require
them to be planned from above. Until quite recently in human history, people built
8 But see Sies, esp. 326-7. Early in the 20th century many middle class suburbanites in the Philadelphia area
were active in the affairs of their central city. However, they were rail commuters.
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their own houses. Even in the early part of the 20th century, workers all over North
America were building their own suburban houses, room by room (Harris 1996). By
now, however, we are thoroughly used to having everything constructed for us. We
have explained above why we feel lack of participation in the mechanistic scientific
establishment was politically disempowering. The same point can be made about lack
of participation in building our own dwellings or planning our neighborhoods.
Participatory Citybuilding: Cohousing and the New Urbanism
Those  who  participate  in  citybuilding  embody  a  worldview  that  transcends
mechanism.  They  see themselves not  as passive recipients of  the fruits  of  scientific
enterprise  but  as  co-creators  of  their  own  social  and  built  environments—at  the
interface between the objective and subjective domains, as Malin would say.
Most examples of this phenomenon, significantly, come from inner cities. One case
is Cedar-Riverside, not far from downtown Minneapolis, where a developer had plans
to  “level  the  entire  area  and construct  … a  massive  complex  of  twenty  high-rise
apartment towers including 12,500 units.” (Nozick 1992, 130) Local activists, with the
help of a favorable court decision and some tax increment9 fund money, have been
developing the  neighborhood with affordable  housing, a  grocery  co-op,  a People’s
Community Center, and the Riverside Co-op Café.
Cedar-Riverside is a working class community. Similar examples are rare—Dudley
Street in Boston (Medoff and Sklar 1994) is one and Banana Kelly in the Bronx (Gratz
1989) is another. 
Middle  class  initiatives are  more common. Cohousing is  an example of mostly
middle class people who are determined to design and even to build their own housing
around a community center,  usually in groups of ten to twenty families.  While this
housing is often in the country or the suburbs—hardly a deterrent to urban sprawl—
sometimes it is downtown, reconfiguring existing houses or even old warehouses (Hester
2005;  McCamant and  Durrett  1988).  The main  point is  that  these  user-designed
pockets of the city are the antithesis of the nonparticipatory worldview. Cohousers have
become their own housing professionals.
One  of  the  strongest  voices  against  sprawl  and  simultaneously  in  favor  of
participatory development comes from a group of architects and planners who call
themselves  New  Urbanists.  Explicitly  rejecting  the  dominance  of  specialized
professionals such as zoning lawyers and civil engineers, New Urbanites involve every
stakeholder  in  the  planning of  a  neighborhood,  via  no-holds-barred brainstorming
sessions (“charettes”) that emerge with practical, physical designs (Kunstler 1996, 135-
6, 147-8). The Charter of New Urbanism states, “We are committed to reestablishing
the relationship between the art of building and the making of community, through
9 The ‘increment’ was  additional  taxes generated by new development.  This  money was  used by the
community to leverage locally driven development.
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citizen-based participatory  planning and design”  (Duany  et  al.  2000,  261).  Andres
Duany,  one  of  New  Urbanism’s  central  figures,  argues,  “Many  successful
neighbourhood improvements  can  trace their  origins  back to  the kitchen tables  of
concerned citizens…. Their common sense is often the only bulwark against the short-
sightedness of conventional developers….”(Davis 2003).10
A post-sprawl  North America  can be  characterized  by  people who participate
actively in the design and building of their neighborhoods, which will reflect diverse
personalities. By definition they will not be part of a homogeneous subdivision. When
small groups of people collectively design their own settlement the result is compact, in
order to reinforce the chances for social contact (Alexander 1985; Fowler 1991). The
settlements almost always  include plans for ecologically sensible waste re-use,  “soft”
energy, and more plants and greenery—even in dense areas of the city (Fowler 1991).
Human symbiosis with, not detachment from, the rest of nature is openly celebrated.
In these ways the mechanistic traditions of objectivity  and professionalism have
been  superseded  in  certain  instances  by  the  actions  of  people  who  embrace the
inevitability of constant participation by humans in all of physical and cultural reality.
Acknowledgement of this participation characterizes the 21st century scientific fields of
quantum physics and the ecological sciences (Capra 1982; Zohar and Marshall 1994).
People who design and build their own neighborhoods have not only integrated the
objective  and  subjective  domains  (to  use  Malin’s  words);  they  have  also  regained
political power taken from them by nonparticipatory mechanistic social and economic
institutions.
While the mechanical worldview grew out of its own era’s culture, its physical and
epistemological legacy is still with us 300 years later. But that legacy was also political:
objectivity forbade us from participating in nature, and professionalism forbade all but
the properly indoctrinated to practise science, or even (now) to build houses. There
was, however, a  lurking contradiction.  On the one hand, at  some level  we are all
collaborating  (“participating”)  to  support  the  social,  technological, and  epistemic
structures we now have. On the other hand, we tend to ignore this fact—mechanical
science is perhaps the new opiate of the masses—and retain a faith in the objectivity
assumption. This syndrome has given us a nonparticipatory worldview that continues
to reinforce itself. Given our democratic ideology, these observations should give us
pause.
II. CERTAINTY AND SECURITY
 Mechanistic  science  can be seen as  an attempt to  find  some certainty  in  the
tumultuous times of the 17th century (Toulmin 1992). Descartes, Newton, and many of
the other scientists of the era were trying to formulate a method that would enable
them to discover reliable truths about nature. We have already noted that these attempts
10 See, however, Marshall  (2000). He argues that New Urbanists insist ‘on putting the developer in the
driver’s seat in shaping places…’ (146)
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were supported, financially and institutionally, by the political and clerical elites at the
time, who were seeking to bolster their legitimacy—and their power—by championing
the new science (Jacob 1988; Dobbs and Jacob 1995). Later, new elites, including those
of professional science, sought to bolster  their legitimacy and power to articulate and
provide the bases for security by appeal to science’s achievements and potential. What
many historians have termed the cult of science—with its core belief that science afforded
an avenue for achieving a sense of security in a rapidly changing industrial world—
emerged among certain thinkers of the Enlightenment, but it reached a crescendo in
the Victorian era (Turner 1993).
The Industrial Revolution and “Control” of Nature
To understand the full impact of the cult of science, it is necessary to grasp the
temper  of  the  Victorian  age.  The world of  the  mid-nineteenth  century witnessed
dramatic advances in science. But ‘science’ meant only partly the empirical approach
to nature. More tangibly, science became identified with its results: the products of
technology. During the long reign of Queen Victoria, the science and technology of the
Industrial Revolution transformed many of the conditions of people’s lives. The first
railroad was built in England in 1825, when Victoria was a little girl. Before that, the
maximum speed of  land travel  was,  for  up-to-date  Englishmen as  it  had been for
Caesars and Pharaohs, the speed of the horse. But before the Queen and Empress died,
at  the  century’s  close,  almost  all  of  Great Britain’s  railroads had  been  built.  The
technology of mechanistic science, driven by the culture of entrepreneurial capitalism,
had begun that liberation of humans from animal muscle,  that acceleration toward
(then) inconceivable velocities, which became characteristic of the twentieth century
(Briggs 2000). 
Mechanistic  technology  was  also  impressive because it  made  things  work.  The
practical, empirical British (and European and North American) mind was fascinated
(Briggs  1989).  So were  the  profit-seekers.  While  Victoria  occupied  the  throne,
transatlantic  steamship  service  was  begun,  power-driven machines  revolutionized
industry, the telegraph and telephone were developed, and the electric lamp and the
automobile  were  invented. City  planning  was  being  refashioned  into  a  scientific
enterprise although developers were still the economic engines of urban development.
The dazzling new inventions promoted a tendency to see technology not as a product
of a scientific culture but as a determinant of social and economic choices, inexorably
driving human progress. Evolution (particularly those versions that incorporated the
concept of progress) became a watchword to the late Victorians despite the notorious
controversies surrounding that theory (Fichman 2002). This was because evolutionary
metaphors seemed to make sense of a wide range of human social relations, including
humanity’s  relationship to  both  its  social  and  physical  environments  (Cooter  and
Pumfrey  1994;  Winter  1998).  Significantly,  evolution  appeared  to  justify  to  many
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Victorians  that  Europeans,  as  claimants  to  the  highest  rung  of  the  ladder  of
“civilization”, had the right,  indeed duty,  to “civilize” and dominate the rest of the
world. As traditional political, economic, religious, and philosophical verities withered
in the bracing air of the cult of science and technology, both elite and popular segments
of society sought new sources of intellectual and spiritual certainty. Evolutionary and
other scientific theories appeared to provide it in domains as diverse as economics,
politics,  gender  relations,  Eurocentrism  and  racism,  imperialism,  science
popularization,  and  the  visualization,  instrumentation,  and  interpretation  of  the
scientific enterprise itself (Lightman, ed. 1997, pp. 72-142, 179-235, 283-289, 312-353,
378-474).
The secularization and modernization of European and North American culture
accelerated during the course of the nineteenth century. The consequences and effects
of that transformation are felt world wide today.11 Faith in an all-knowing and all-
powerful  God  has, for  many,  been replaced  by,  or  incorporated  with,  faith  in  a
scientific understanding of natural forces, human history,  and evolution,  and in the
promises of progress made by the technological juggernaut of industrial capitalism. By
the close of the nineteenth century, it seemed as if this understanding assured human
domination  over  other  species  and  the  environment  (as  if  we  humans  were  not
inescapably  part  of  that  environment)  and  our  apparent  control  over  health  and
disease.  Mechanistic  science  was a  key  ingredient  in  the  cult  of  progress that  the
Victorian era bequeathed to the twentieth century (Turner 1993, 35-37, 71-72, 119-
120, 126-127).
Events of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have shown what an ill-
conceived notion “control of nature” is (Capra 2002, 1982). The presumed triumph of
secular  science  over  traditional  religious  and  other  cultural  authorities  is  also  in
question.  The contemporary  dialectic  between  science and the  broader culture  is
manifested in legal and ethical controversies over scientific creationism, reproductive
technologies,  global  warming,  and  depletion  of  bio-diversity  (Appignanesi  2002;
Fichman 1997, 2002). 
Certainty in the Social Sciences: Comte and Positivism
However, despite these significant controversies, and their 19th century precursors,
the champions of mechanistic science succeeded in persuading society that they were
offering certainty in the form of a more controlled physical environment. Scientists
11But the transformation was anything but inevitable, unproblematic, or systematically steady. Victorian
science,  religion,  politics,  and  societal  and  institutional  structures  were  complex  and  dynamically
interacting and changing aspects of the human condition. Only when this is recognized does it become
possible  to  understand  Victorian  culture—and  the  crucial  role  of  science  within  that  culture—as  a
pluralistic and shifting landscape. The relationship between science and Victorian culture was thus a two-
way street. There was a veritable traffic in ideas and practices in the nineteenth century (Lightman 1997, 9,
15). Those debates were puzzling, often traumatic, to the society of that age.
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themselves sought certainty within the scientific establishment by defining increasingly
specialized  niches  (Secord  1986;  Wise  1995;  Van  Helden  and  Hankins  1994).  In
addition, some disciplines such as history, psychology, sociology, and economics sought
to divest themselves of aspects of their philosophical past and acquire the legitimizing
aura of science. In the processes of specializing and insulating themselves from their
pre-Newtonian past,  professionals  and career  scientists built  up a secure intellectual
fortress from whose ramparts they could make objective pronouncements about the
proper direction  of  public  policy  as  well  as  social  and technological development
(Friedman 1987, 87-223).
Although the debate on the precise relationship between the social sciences and the
natural  sciences  continues  to  our  own  day,  the  Enlightenment  ideal  of  a  socially
legitimate scientific model for all explanation exercised a profound allure for influential
thinkers as diverse as Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx (Gordon 1991; Cohen 1994).
One of the most significant exponents of this aspect of the Enlightenment was Auguste
Comte (1798—1857). His elaborate systematization of the links between the various
sciences is known as positivism. 
Comte’s overarching goal was to apply scientific methods to the study of human
societies and place the knowledge of human institutions on as secure a footing as the
laws  of  the  inorganic  world.  Positivism  was  instrumental  in  the  development  of
sociology as a distinct scientific discipline. Comte’s ideal of science was modeled on the
mechanistic  Newtonianism  of  Laplace  and  Lagrange.  Insofar  as  Comte  identified
himself as a natural scientist, it was mathematics that he knew best. Tellingly, he first
called his approach to the science of society “social physics”—before changing that to
“sociology” after 1840. To be sure, as Comte refined his ideas on the social sciences, he
necessarily had to massage his mechanistic reductionism to deal with the complexities
of the sociopolitical world. But Comte never wavered from his unambiguous assertion
that the ‘aim of science is prediction’, with the corollary that “the aim of prediction is
control” (Laudan,  pp. 376-377, 378).12 Comtean positivism was particularly influential
in the genesis of systems of control such as technocracy, social engineering, “scientific
management”, and industrial psychology (Coleman 1978; Waites 1989; Pickering 1993;
Brown 1997; Kent 1978). For Comte, scientific formulation was inextricably tied to a
social goal: philosophy had to be realized in politics (Pickering 1993, 570-574; Scharff
1995, 102-105), and planners were legitimate only as implementers of immutable laws
established by science (Friedman 1987, 71). Comte and the urban planners influenced
by him believed that prediction and control were the cornerstones of social planning. 
12 Comte’s famous aphorism first appeared as “Science, d’ou prevoyance; prevoyance,
d’ou action” [“From Science comes Prevision; From Prevision comes Action”], in his
Cours de Philosophie Positive (Comte 1830, tome I, p. 52).
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The Rise of Statistical Thinking
Concurrent  with  the  rise  of  positivism  was  the  increased  authority  given  to
quantitative methods  and  models  in  the  professionalizing  disciplines (Smith  1998;
Harman 1982). The sophistication and extension of quantitative analysis lent greater
authority and certainty to the findings of the so-called exact sciences. The growth of
statistical reasoning was crucial to the rise in the cultural authority of science during the
19th century. It  became apparent  that improvements  on classical probability theory
were necessary to analyse an increasingly dynamic and perhaps unstable mass society.
Statistics appealed to practitioners and theorists as a reliable method of searching for
the regularity that characterized the seeming randomness of individual and singular
events. Scientific determinism—though it had many critics—seemed as achievable in
the social  as  it  was  (apparently)  in  the  physical  and biological  sciences.  The great
improvement  in  accuracy  of  demographic,  economic,  anthropometric,  and  social
records early in the 19th century permitted statistics to become perceived by many in
Europe and North America as the “numerical science of society”. Statistics thus joined
the ranks of the other ostensibly objective sciences in so far as its practitioners were seen
as being loath to go beyond the ‘facts.’ Adolphe Quetelet was one of the most famous
and able of those who sought to erect compelling statistical analyses not only of public
affairs but also of the psychology and behavior of individuals within society (Porter
1995).
The ascendancy of quantitative and statistical reasoning was not an uncontested
path. Charles Dickens surely spoke for many of his contemporaries in his bitterly anti-
statistical novel Hard Times (1854). Many readers were repelled by Thomas Gradgrind’s
[patriarch of Coketown] command to the schoolmaster that he teach “these boys and
girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out
everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts; nothing
else will ever be of any service to them” (Dickens 1854, 1). Indeed, the belief in the
legitimacy of numbers, or of knowledge in any form, is a social and moral problem as
much as it is a scientific one. Statistical reasoning, nonetheless, won the allegiance of
sufficient numbers of those in power, as well as of many segments of the population, to
emerge as a major handmaiden to mechanistic science during the Victorian era. In the
end, the security that numbers afforded seemed to banish most doubts and fears of
those  living  in  an  emerging  techno-scientific  age  (Porter  1995,  3-86,  217-231;
Gigerenzer, Daston, et al. 1989, 1-69, 235-292).
Scientific Certainty and Models of Suburban Development
The mechanistic worldview,  then,  was an attempt to find some certainty in the
turbulent times of the 17th century and in fact served a similar function in the 19th
century. This search for certainty relates to cities and suburbs in several ways, again
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illuminated by dominant schools of urban planners of the late 19th century.  
Starting in the 14th century, landowners—mostly nobles—in continental Europe as
well as in England took over (“enclosed”) land traditionally used by peasants for their
crops and livestock. This process accelerated in the 17th and 18th centuries, displacing
tens of thousands of people, not only physically but also emotionally (McQuaig 2001;
Polanyi 1957). Refugees from these enclosures poured into the growing industrial cities
of  North America and Europe,  cities that seemed to  be growing uglier  and more
anarchic.  They became dangerous places, and those who could afford it sought the
certainty  of  ordered  suburban  tranquillity.  Suburbs  were  seen  as  the  way  to  cut
themselves off from the rough-and-tumble sidewalks of downtown, where the air and
streets were dirty and where anything could happen.
The design of these pre-20th century suburbs was qualitatively different, of course,
from the car-driven sprawl of today. The former were enclaves for the privileged few
and  had  almost  none  of  the  political,  social,  and  ecological  consequences  of
contemporary suburbs. We argue, however that the most important similarity between
the older  and newer  suburbs—the unbroken thread to  focus on—is  the motive to
escape the central city, in the quest for security.
Those people who experienced 19th and 20th century cities as unpredictable and
dangerous and who sought  security  in the suburbs were not,  to be sure, conscious
agents of the 17th century mechanistic worldview. But elements of this worldview can be
discerned in the language used by developers to attract these people to their expansive
new communities on the urban fringe. Ironically, Ebenezer Howard, who developed
plans for worker-run self-sufficient cities in the late 19th century, used such language.
Totally at odds with Howard’s ideology, however, numerous entrepreneurs used his
label of Garden City for their suburban developments, describing them as places where
residents  could  be  closer  to  “nature”,  as  we  have  already  seen.  However,  the
developers’ pre-planned subdivisions were examples,  as  well,  of  the prediction and
control dimensions of mechanism (Jackson 1985; Hall 1988). Home buyers were being
offered an ordered refuge from the chaos of the city. 
Thus, the suburbs fulfilled a need for certainty by being a predictable environment.
The ultimate remedy for the disorderly city was in planned subdivisions13 where houses
all  looked  the  same,  and  where  residential  uses  were  strictly  segregated  from
commercial and especially industrial uses. The tool of zoning was used to ensure that
areas  were  uniformly  covered  either  with  thousands of  houses, immense shopping
malls,  or industrial “parks” (Fowler,  1992).  Specialized land use was the mirror of
specialized science.
The developers’  blandishments  were,  in  fact,  appealing  to  widespread cultural
values rooted in the Enlightenment. The philosophes had made a convincing case that
human well-being could be achieved by scientifically-informed control of nature, and
planned suburbs seemed to confirm that proposition. 
13 See Harris (1996) for a disapproving description of unplanned working class suburbs, however.
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The Paradoxes of Homeownership
As  cities  grew  crowded,  and  land  became more  expensive,  newcomers  were
compelled to rent. Here was another source of uncertainty. Tenants were always in
danger of having their rents doubled or of being evicted. In Europe, the political system
stepped in to protect tenants, while North Americans showed less concern for ensuring
a roof over everyone’s head (Beatley 2000; Jackson 1985, 102). 
In North America, uncertainty about shelter led to a search for security in the form
of a single family home, owner-occupied—one of the hallmarks of sprawl. Security was
found less in territorial communities than in the abstract, placeless reassurances of legal
ownership of property. The guarantees of legal ownership were enormously appealing
to the descendants of those who had been chased off feudal land by the Enclosures.
This was especially true of those who were not so well off. In 1900, in some cities, the
middle class rented in the suburbs,  while the working class underwent considerable
privations to own their own houses,  because it  made them feel economically more
secure (Harris 1996; Sies 2001). 
But the suburban formula for certainty came at a heavy economic and political
cost. Homeowners became trapped in a network of dependencies such as mortgages,
traffic-clogged  streets,  and  those  ubiquitous  malls  with  identical  stores.  Ironically,
escaping to homeownership in the suburbs was a way of giving away one’s power—to
the banks, to the traffic engineers, and to the developers of subdivisions and malls (Dale
1999; Zukin 1991, 11). In exchange for protection from the ugly and anarchic city, the
suburbs have in fact become a new regime with its own forms of authoritarianism, as
Mumford  suggests:  “In  escaping  the  complex  cooperations  of  the  city  Suburbia
recovers  the  original  vices  of  overspecialization  and  rigid  control”  (509).  The
overspecialization refers to land use separation, which will be considered below. The
control, on the other hand, is not just in the building process. Mumford, with his usual
prescience, wrote in 1961,
Each member of Suburbia becomes imprisoned by the very separation that he
has prized: he is fed through a narrow opening: a telephone line, a radio band, a
television circuit. This is not … the result of a conscious conspiracy by a cunning
minority:  it  is  an  organic  by-product  of  an  economy  that  sacrifices  human
development to mechanical processing. (512-3) (See also 542) 
As with everything else, it  is  easier to see others’ enslavement than our own. Daily
behavior becomes so much a part of personality that we do not notice the chains we
have fashioned for ourselves in the search for security. Critiques such as Mumford’s
have become scarcer as most North Americans become inured to the landscape of
suburbia.
This  landscape is  not  just  residential.  It  also  includes technological artifacts—
bridges, factories, highways, skyscrapers, malls, and so forth—that have become part of
modern ‘nature’. Viewed thus, landscape refers to the scientific, economic, and political
contours of  society  as  well  as  to  the  physical  environment  (Schama 1995,  10-18;
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Golinski 1998, 103-132; Shukin 2001). The suburbs themselves were seen as a version
of techno-scientific progress in the 19th century, especially as an example of the miracles
of transportation and construction technology (Jackson 1985, ch.2 and 7). It was this
techno-scientific landscape, planned by and built with large scale capital, which, from
the 19th century on, promised North Americans a security that could not be found in
what was seen as a chaotic central city. 
City Planning as Mechanistic Ideology
One of the players in the search for suburban security was the planning movement,
specifically through its role in the homogenization of land use. We have noted Comte’s
central role in developing the idea that scientific planning should be a powerful tool for
social  reform.  Although  always  distrusted  as  incipient  enemies  of  the  inherently
beneficial  market  economy,  planners  and  their  ideas  covered  the  full  ideological
spectrum from left to right (Friedman 1987, 55). Urban planning became important
towards the end of the 19th century as part of the urban reform movement in both the
US and Canada (Rutherford 1984; Scott 1971, ch.2 and 3). Planners were often hired
by chambers of commerce seeking to regain some sense of order in an era of explosive
urban growth (Lindstrom 2002; Moore 1979). Planning was a clear example of how
professions  were  establishing  themselves  as  specialties  legitimized  by  their  use  of
quantitative scientific methods. “The belief of city planners [early in the 20th century] in
efficiency and science was intense” (Gunton 1979, 181).
Nevertheless,  in  most  cities,  staff  planners  tend  to  be facilitators  of  a  complex
process of building development  rather  than shapers of the city (Fowler 1992; Leo
2002). On the other hand, a small group of writers on urban planning—such as Frank
Lloyd Wright,  Le Corbusier,  and Ebenezer Howard—have influenced the kinds of
developments that get proposed. Many of these larger developments are the results of
public/private  development  partnerships,  which  illustrate  North  Americans’
ambivalent  (hypocritical?)  attitude  towards keeping  government  separate  from  the
private sector. Perhaps urban planning is all right as long as businessmen are in control
of the process, which often seems to be the case (Lorimer 1972; Leo 2002; Squires
1989).
Institutionalized planning experienced a renaissance after World War II in North
America, when there was a need for hundreds of thousands of new homes, fast—for
returning soldiers and for those whose housing needs had been postponed during the
war. “Members of the professional class … returned from the war with a whole new
approach to accomplishing large-scale tasks, centered on the twin acts of classifying and
counting. … Town planning became a technical profession based upon numbers. As a
result, the American city was reduced into the simplistic categories and quantities of
sprawl.” (Duany et al. 2001, 11; Banfield and Wilson 1963, 191)
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Planning, by definition, must be seen as a tool for achieving some kind of certainty,
and, as such,  control.  There is  an unwillingness to trust  the Invisible  Hand of  the
market place (Bookchin 1974, 100). Modern planning arose in North America when
big developers, responding to dramatic urban growth in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries,  started  to  build  hundreds  and  then  thousands  of  houses  at  one  time.
Development of this scale needed regulation, and, just as important, needed planning
to  organize  its  own  large  scale  operations  (Gilpin  1986).  Planning  regulated  the
expansion of suburban housing in North America—it didn’t prevent it.
North Americans, jealous of private property rights, put their faith in market forces.
The market is touted by its supporters as a democratic way to make decisions, including
those about urban form; but there is reason to doubt this belief (McQuaig 2001). A
more accurate picture is that even when no formal urban planning principles are being
applied—which is often—sprawl has still been shaped by government-funded systems
of  transportation and communication, and by  market  regulation and subsidization
(Franklin 1990; Marshall 2000), including mortgages on single family homes and other
developments  on  the  fringes  of  cities  (Fowler  1992;  Savitch  2002).  Like  many
infrastructure policies these were not decided on democratically (Franklin 1990). They
were the product of heavy lobbying by the construction industries in both the US and
Canada, even though the results were politically popular in some quarters (which was
the intent)(Fowler 1992). As Richard Register puts it,
…[M]ost people were personally compromised, bought off.  By the mid-1950s
tens of millions worked for the auto/sprawl/freeway/oil industrial complex, or
were in debt to it or hooked on its products. This made them blind to the pitfalls
and contradictions of the development patterns enveloping them. (Register 2000,
108)
Once again, many North Americans are seen as unaware of their own enslavement.
Within the parameters of these non-market forces,  many of the most important
planning decisions are taken by large developers and by CEOs of large corporations
seeking to build—or to close—offices, warehouses, factories, or subdivisions (Ray and
Roberge 1981; Smith 1979).  Market  apologists  might  argue that  house-buyers  and
other consumers can influence the big companies by a series of individual decisions; but
those  decisions  are  extremely  susceptible  to  highly  effective  advertisements  that
manipulate our values and preferences, starting from an early age (Klein 2000). One
plausible explanation of why North Americans in search of security have flocked to
suburbs whose benefits are so questionable is that they have been bombarded since the
cradle with persuasive images of the suburban dream (Mies 2001, 330; Jackson 1985,
102). The primary sources of those images of planned communities have been the large
developers,  for  over  a  century.  We  would  argue,  though,  as  refugees  from  the
Enclosures, many North Americans  were even more drawn to the suburban ideal.
Alexander (1972) has shown that Americans are more attracted to single-family homes
centered in larger lots than Viennese, except neurotic ones.
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The planning component of suburban sprawl can thus be traced in various ways to
17th century society’s quest for certainty and to the epistemology that embodied that
quest. For Europeans, it has taken the form of government planning initiatives. On the
other side of the Atlantic the search is to own a single family home, in the arena of an
unpredictable and relatively placeless housing market. Urban planning is a place-based
arbiter  between  homebuyers  and  developers  or  other  large  corporations,  whose
lobbyists and advertisements shape individual as well as collective choices.
 Living With Uncertainty—Evolutionary Urban Growth
Scientists in the 20th and 21st centuries have determined that nature is far from
random, but that humans are deluded if they believe that nature can always be reliably
predicted (Capra 1996; Zohar and Marshall  1994).  Heisenberg discovered that  the
mass  and  location  of  quantum  particles  could  never  be  known simultaneously—
knowing  the  mass  precluded  being  certain  about  its  position,  and  vice  versa
(Heisenberg 1971).
Quantum mechanics puts into question some of the more deterministic aspirations
of science, thus potentially undermining the positivist rationale behind planning for
progress. Reformist planners have seen themselves for decades as agents of progress
(Friedman 1987; Register 2000). But if there is one thing that seems clear, it is that
progress as such is difficult to plan, though it often exhibits identifiable patterns. Gratz
describes a South Bronx neighborhood that illustrates this principle. She relates how,
starting with a single family, residents of one street slowly but with great perseverance
gained possession of  buildings  that were  going to  be demolished because absentee
owners  were  behind  in  their  property  taxes.  The  family,  some  neighbors,  social
workers, and a few other helpers offered “to take the buildings off the city’s hands and
renovate them. They were willing to … provide some unpaid labor. They wanted to
build  low-cost  cooperative  housing  that  would  not  be  a  permanent  burden  on
taxpayers, as was massive subsidized new construction… ” (Gratz 1989, 113-4).
While  the  housing  proposal  was  being  worked  out,  these  residents  started  a
community garden, organized a food cooperative, and started recycling paper and
glass. 
Dozens  of  young  residents  learned  the  skills  needed  in  carpentry  and
construction  for  the  renovation  process.  As  new  residents  filled  up  the
apartments,  local  merchants  stopped  going  out  of  business  and  new  stores
opened. All this happened rather gradually, over a period of ten or more years.
(Fowler 2004, 50)
When the successes in this neighborhood became known at City Hall, policymakers
immediately wanted to apply this ‘model’ to other derelict areas. As Gratz notes, this
completely misses the point that urban evolution comes out of creativity defined by the
genius of a particular place. It cannot be planned from above—a conceit inherited from
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mechanistic science. 
Examples already referred to illustrate how small-scale, user-designed areas of the
city  develop  organically,  without  an  endpoint  in  view  (although some  cohousing
projects do seem that way). Some of the most vital city districts are those that have
somehow slipped  through  conventional  development  frameworks and  escaped the
ministrations of city planners and large developers. McKnight (1995, 84-6) gives the
example of a group of working class people in Chicago who learned that fresh fruit and
vegetables could help their significant respiratory problems. Instead of trying to figure
out how to buy all this, they had the idea of building a greenhouse on the roof of a two-
story apartment. Their extra produce earned them some money and used otherwise
wasted energy leaking through the poorly insulated roof. Senior citizens were attracted
to the greenhouse, worked in it, and developed new friendships and energy—they felt
excited and empowered.
None of all this was planned, none of it could have been planned. In each case, in
fact,  whether  it  was  cohousing  or  greenhousing, the  project  was  a  leap  into  the
unknown. Uncertainty marked every step of the way.
The New Urbanists, mentioned above,  clearly approve of  planning. They have
produced a draft plan framework, although it  is  highly flexible.  They propose that
planning be pro-active and highly participatory instead of simply reactive to developers’
proposals (Duany et al. 2000, 224-8; Leo 2002). The result is often a disorderly scrap
(Kunstler 1996, 190) so the outcome, once again, is always uncertain.  
It  is  natural  for  our  mechanistic  minds  to  be  uncomfortable  with  uncertainty
implied by no plans (or leaders). Yet North American sprawl illustrates what happens if
we cling to the illusion of  certainty. Using mechanistic principles to plan suburban
development has ended up producing chaos, while parts of some downtowns are being
rebuilt from below, restoring a sense of order (Marshall 2000). Gratz and Mint have
shown that these rebuildings grow like a garden, with participating citizens acting like
husbandmen (1998). Planned projects that assume a finished product deny the organic
nature of truly urban places—a house, a neighborhood, a city is always evolving (Lerup
1977). If humans need a pattern language as an intelligent guide to urban husbandry,
the language can eventually be dropped, says Alexander, because it only “reminds us of
what we know already” (1979, xv). These writers are not anarchists, but they suggest
that  relaxing  the  determinism  of  mechanistic  science  will  help  humans  fit  their
settlements  more  gracefully  into  what  is,  after  all,  an  ecosystem,  not  a  piece  of
machinery.
III. REDUCTIONISM TRUMPED BY AN EITHER/OR UNIVERSE
One of the key tenets of Newtonian physics is that two objects cannot occupy the
same place at the same time. This is because objects are seen to be made of irreducible,
impenetrable  matter—mechanistic physics  was  materialistic.  Mutual  exclusivity has
fostered a tendency in our culture to separate things into discrete,  pure categories.
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Mutual exclusivity is also essential to reductionism, which asserts that entities of a given
kind are collections or combinations of entities of a simpler or more basic kind. Further,
such entities  are definable in terms of  expressions denoting the more basic entities.
Thus, the ideas  that  physical  bodies  are  collections  of  atoms or  that  thoughts  are
combinations of sense impressions are forms of reductionism. Though by no means
universally accepted, the reductionist paradigm has been enormously influential (Jones
2000). There is a basic appeal to the idea that, in order to find out how something
works, we need to examine its separate parts.
Starting in the late 17th century and continuing into the 19th century, scientists have
divided their  study into increasingly specialized areas,  in keeping with the ethos of
reductionism. Just as observers distanced themselves from the observed, and observed
phenomena from each other, so these observers separated themselves from each other. As
we have previously  demonstrated,  the specialization of  science (including the social
sciences)  was the Siamese twin of professionalization in the 19th century. And while
these twins could not be surgically—or institutionally or epistemologically—separated,
the “objects” studied by mechanistic science could be. By the start of the 20th century,
the  tendency  to  separate  and  isolate  previously  integrated  aspects  of  culture  had
become an obsession.  Of  course, certain developments  in  contemporary  science—
notably in quantum physics, relativity theory, ecology, and the quest for “organizing
principles” in developmental biology and genetics (Capra 1996)—are forcing a broad
rethinking of many of the basic assumptions of mechanistic/reductionist science. But
the reductionist paradigm, with its roots in the transformation of scientific thought and
methodology in the 17th and 18th centuries,  remains a potent  epistemological and
cultural metaphor.
Of special import to our study is the appeal of reductionism to students of society.
During the Enlightenment, various visions of a more perfect social order were rooted in
the conviction that science—especially  in its mechanistic mode—would provide the
fundamental laws that govern humanity’s proper actions. It was Turgot, his brilliant
protégé the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794), and their circle who first coined the
term social sciences. The term itself is highly significant. For these individuals believed
that it would be a  science of society—based on the scientific method’s combination of
reason  and  experiment,  and  using  reductive  and  quantitative  methods  whenever
possible—which  should  and  would  replace  the  various  systems  of  tradition  and
authority that had previously governed human history. As society was broken down
into  its  material  components  of  population,  resources,  industry,  and  so  on,  the
reduction  of  human beings  to  autonomous  social atoms became a  more  common
theoretical device (Johannisson 1990, 361; Cohen 1994). We have already seen that
“scientific” urban reform at the end of the 19th century proposed rule by experts over
their special areas of municipal policy—such as police, health, and transit—as a way of
solving urban problems. 
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Social and Physical Monocultures
Although modern science has discovered that Nature’s  secrets are not so easily
disentangled  as  Turgot  and  his  coterie  believed,  the  North  American  social  and
physical environment still reflects the 17th  and 18th century fixation on separation and
reduction.  On  our  industrialized  farms,  single  crops  are  planted  in  huge fields  to
accommodate the demands of petro-chemical agriculture and its machines. We divide
our schedules into work time and play time and assume the two cannot overlap. In the
19th century,  in the United States,  there was a widespread movement to purify the
home as a haven of domesticity, presided over by women, while the workplace was
imagined as the equally exclusive domain of the man (Jackson 1985, 47-52; Hayden
1984). Cities and suburbs have been divided into large areas of single uses—residential,
commercial, and industrial—partly because of the growth in the scale of enterprises,
starting in the 19th century (Katznelson 1981). This land use segregation reflected the
growing tendency to separate work from other parts of our lives. The suburbs express
separation  perfectly,  since  they  were  created  to  avoid  industrial  pollution  and
commercial density found in the central city. As we have noted, land use was from the
start separated throughout the suburbs. Everything—from standardized housing to the
same chain stores in malls—became homogenized. Monoculture was social as well as
physical, because suburbs were explicitly marketed as havens from the central city’s mix
of incomes, nationalities, and races. Jackson reports that “in 1960 not a single one of
the Long Island Levittown’s 82,000 residents was black” (1985, 241). Suburbs became
socially  and  racially  more  heterogeneous  starting  in  the  1960s,  but  some  analysts
maintain that the segregating tendencies of suburban culture remains (Gottdiener 1994;
Dreier et al. 2001).  
From the very beginning,  of course,  cities  have been segregated into sub-areas.
Spiro  Kostoff  (1992)  has  summarised  some  of  the  dozens  of  different  criteria  for
dividing up the city in pre-industrial times—religious, commercial, governmental, and
residential districts, for example, to say nothing of ethnic and class divisions. While the
viability  of  governmental  and religious  districts  was connected to  scale—they were
functional only up to a certain size—the commercial and residential components of the
city have been far more elastic. This is because of the commodification of land, which
blossomed dramatically in the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe and North America
(Polanyi 1957). Once most urban land was being sold to the highest bidder, uses sorted
themselves out according to what they could afford, from office buildings (which could
pay enormous rents), to stores, factories, and residences, whose abilities to pay for space
varied within as well as between categories of use (Hurst 1975, 92-8). The explosion of
cities  in the 19th century enshrined these uses  in  concrete.  The size  and extent  of
homogeneous land use was  related to the cost of  land, which was only marginally
sensitive  to  the  scale of  development  or,  interestingly,  to  the workability  of  a  city
district. (Fowler 1992, 145; Jacobs 1961, ch.13) One of the most important factors in
producing the huge,  dysfunctional  subdivisions we have in North America was the
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abundance of relatively low cost land, which made single family homes that much more
accessible to working class people (Jackson 1985).
 Buying  and  selling  land  is  an  illustration  of  the  mechanistic  worldview’s
materialism (Barber 1984). First, the land market needs the concept of private property,
which by definition excludes everyone but the owner from the property. Combined
with the separation of uses by rent, private property upholds materialism’s axiom: no
two uses or owners can occupy the same place at the same time. Second, the land
market  also  reflects  a  profound separation  from  the  land,  which  is  treated  as  a
commodity—an illusion,  since  humans cannot  create  land (Polanyi  1957,  Ch.  6).
Affection  for  a  place goes  unrecognized,  subordinated,  repressed.  This  affection is
attenuated both when single use areas are created and when we relate to land as an
instrument (notice the prevalence of the term “land use”.) 
Functional segregation and emotional separation have produced more and more
places with little meaning to people who “use” them. Not places with no meaning at all,
but places without the richness of history or of a mixture of activities and energies
(Stefanovic 2000). Indeed, these places have lost so much of their meaning that many
writers have noted that they seem placeless. “There is no there, there,” said Gertrude
Stein of Oakland’s suburbs.
In the 1920s, a second generation of urban planners developed regional planning,
which stressed the inter-relatedness of cities and their hinterlands (Hall 1988, Ch. 5).
However, contemporary city and suburb building is never done with an eye to how the
whole fits  together,  because in true mechanistic  tradition the whole  city  is  seen as
nothing more than the sum of its parts (Marshall 2000, 108-9). This might be why little
effective regional planning—including features such as Urban Growth Boundaries—
exists in North America (Anthony 2004).
Building with Multiple Uses—Either/Or versus Both/And
Modern  physics  and the  study of  ecology—to say  nothing of  numerous  poets,
novelists,  and visual artists—see places as multi-dimensional.  In a  real sense,  place
cannot be separated from time (Sheldrake 1995). At the micro-level, the location of a
particle has to be expressed in terms of probability unless the observer wants to pin it
down to a particular place at a particular time, in which case other information about
the particle is lost. Atoms, their sub-particles, and their energy waves interpenetrate
each other in a way that contradicts the Newtonian assumption that two things cannot
be in the same place at  the same time. Photons and electrons can be observed as
particles, but they are simultaneously waves of energy. The world of quantum physics,
Zohar and Marshall have argued, is a world of “both/and” (Berman 1981; Zohar and
Marshall 1994). Space cannot be separated from time, for instance—there is a space
time continuum. Cultural anthropologists have found many cultures in which this is a
perfectly understandable concept, because place is still  of the utmost importance to
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them (Abram 1996). 
Many  urban areas illustrate the possibilities  of  both/and building.  At the most
prosaic level, the New Urbanism Code explicitly calls for mixed land use (Duany et al.
2000, 260-3). The most vibrant and successful city districts have close-grained mixed
land use. (Keep in mind that, if one includes within one’s scope enough land, its uses
will always be mixed.) Small scale shops, offices, and residences all jumbled together
might seem messy, but these uses acquire their own harmony, their own history, and,
indeed, their own way of inspiring affection for the neighborhood. Jane Jacobs (1961)
demonstrated this truth over forty years ago, and she was widely praised for her insights
into  the  city.  Systematic  research  has  supported her  insights  (Fowler  1987).  The
examples already given show how easily one grass roots initiative in a particular place
turns into a multitude of different projects, such as the greenhouse in Chicago that
turned into energy savings, economic development, and a healthy focus for seniors.
The Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, in addition to its  numerous affordable housing
units and business enterprises, ended up with six performing arts theatres, a system of
child-care homes, and classes in entrepreneurial skills offered by the area’s community
development corporation.
These  examples  of  both/and  development  can  only  be  expressed  in  a
neighborhood over time. A mechanistic snapshot of the processes could never capture the
reality of urban dynamism that they represent.
CONCLUSION
Our paper began with the question of  why  suburban sprawl  continues despite
decades of books, articles, and policy papers clearly demonstrating its economic waste,
environmental devastation, and social and political dysfunctions. We have argued that
sprawl’s attraction in North America stems can be traced in part to the 17th century
mechanistic worldview and the upheavals that put it in place. This worldview is still
ingrained  in  our  21st century  psyches,  which  is  why  the  large  corporations  and
governments that subsidize them and give them life (through charters) are so powerful.
As powerful as they are, it  is  as much a mistake to blame these institutions as the
primary sources of suburbanization as it would be to blame a quarterback for losing a
football game. We are all implicated. Our argument has been that the economic and
political  forces  that  came  together  to  build  North  American  suburbs  cannot  be
separated meaningfully from the mechanistic worldview of the men and women who
direct those forces. 
The overwhelming physical dominance of large scale, segregated development has
political implications. That is, it shapes North Americans’ views of what is normal, of
what is  possible,  and therefore of  what land use policy  could  be.  In this  way,  the
physical environment helps to set the political agenda of North American governments
—at all levels. Large subdivisions of housing, shopping malls, and office towers need to
be built by large developers and planned for by big governments. Once in place, these
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formidable  institutions  consolidated  their  considerable  political  power  over  land
development and even over the formulation of alternative public policies (Fowler 1992,
121-8). We do not discount the powerful incentives provided by these public policies
that subsidize highways and cars, single family dwellings, and other features of urban
sprawl. We insist,  however,  that  these  policies are  symptoms of  the  prior  cultural
conditioning we have tried to describe. 
Cohousers,  the  residents  of  Cedar  Riverside,  and  Chicagoans  who  build
greenhouses on their roofs are evincing, in a visceral way, a scientific worldview that
includes mechanistic science but is far broader. Clues to the shape of future cities can
be found by noticing the organic,  unplanned activities of city-dwellers sprouting like
weeds in the formal gardens planted by Descartes and Newton. These activities are
playing out the newest phase of the history of the co-evolution of science and social
structures. Sprawl, whose appeal is related to earlier phases, is an extremely costly and
even dangerous form of development. We have given a number of examples of creative
citybuilding that challenge sprawl. These examples epitomize the link between scientific
paradigms and urban development. 
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